Il dibattito sul Quantitiative Easing 2 e sul gioco in anticipo della Fed

Dalle colonne del Wall Street Journal Jeremy Siegel si lancia in un'appassionata difesa della politica della Fed (una versione leggermente più estesa dell'articolo era comparsa qualche giorno fa su Yahoo Finance). Secondo Siegel

The recent surge in long-term Treasury yields has led many to say that the Fed's second round of quantitative easing is a failure. The critics predict that QE2 may end up hurting rather than helping the economic recovery, as higher rates nip in the bud any rebound in the housing market and dampen capital spending. But the rise in long-term Treasury rates does not signal that the Fed's policy has backfired. It is a sign that the Fed's policy is succeeding.
Long-term Treasury rates are influenced positively by economic growth—which encourages consumers to borrow in anticipation of higher incomes and causes firms to seek funds to expand capacity—and by inflationary expectations. Long-term Treasury rates are affected negatively by risk aversion: Seeking a safe haven, investors pile into Treasury bonds, running up their prices and lowering their yields.
The Fed's QE2 program has raised expectations of growth and inflation, sending long-term Treasury rates up. It has also lowered risk aversion, which implies rising long-term rates. The evidence for a decline in risk aversion among investors is the shrinkage in the spreads between Treasury and other fixed-income securities, the strong performance of the stock market, and the decline in VIX, the indicator of future stock-market volatility. This means that expectations of accelerating economic growth—and a reduction in the fear of a double-dip recession—are the driving forces behind the rise in rates. 

Siegel fa appello alle lezioni di Friedman per dare ancora maggiore autorità alla sua tesi e riprende i commenti del grande economista di Chicago sulla politica monetaria durante la Grande Depressione e sulla crisi inflazionistica degli anni Settanta:

I remember him stressing that the extremely low interest rates of the early 1930s were not indicative of an easy monetary policy. They were instead the result of the Fed's drastically tight policy, which did not provide enough reserves to failing banks and drove the economy into the Great Depression.
Similarly, the double-digit interest rates that we witnessed in the 1970s were not indicative of the Fed's brave stance against inflation but of a far-too-easy policy that inflated the money supply and heightened inflationary expectations. 


Il punto fondamentale di Siegel è che occorre tenere conto anche dei dati relativi alla crescita economica nel giudicare l'andamento dei tassi di interesse e l'efficacia della politica della Fed: 

But monetary tightening will only begin if the pace of the economic recovery accelerates significantly next year, which I believe is increasingly likely.
We should not look only at interest rates to judge whether monetary policy is working. Indeed, in the present situation, if long-term rates were not rising, it would be a sign that the economy is in serious trouble—a sign that investors are worried about deflation and a decline in economic activity.

Nello stesso giorno in cui il WSJ dà spazio alla difesa di Siegel, il New York Times dedica invece un articolo a Thomas Hoenig, presidente della Federal Reserve Bank di Kansas City prossimo alla pensione e da sempre l'oppositore numero uno all'interno del FOMC di Bernanke e della sua politica espansiva. La tesi di Hoenig è semplice:

If it were up to him, he would keep interest rates very low, but would not promise to keep them at essentially zero for “an extended period,” as the Fed has announced. He says he thinks that trying to lower long-term rates, as the Fed is doing by buying bonds, is a mistake. The recovery, however slow and painful, he says, cannot be hurried.
As the longest-serving regional Fed president, his views are shaped by the uncontrolled inflation of the 1970s, the spike in land prices that followed and the ensuing banking and thrift crises.
To him, Mr. Bernanke’s plan is “a dangerous gamble” and “a bargain with the devil,” strong words that have rankled some officials of the Fed, where dissent is tolerated but not celebrated.

Intanto proprio ieri sera la Fed ha deciso di mantenere i tassi invariati e proseguire l'acquisto di obbligazioni del Tesoro U.S.A. (il QE2): qui potete leggere il comunicato ufficiale nel quale si legge

To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to continue expanding its holdings of securities as announced in November. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month. (...)
The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period.
The Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and will employ its policy tools as necessary to support the economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate.

La decisione è stata unanime, beh...quasi unanime, con un solo voto contrario...sapete già di chi. 

Per concludere vi segnalo inoltre l'articolo di Mario Platero su Plus24 di sabato scorso (L'Europa non gioca d'anticipo, a pag. 12 del supplemento): arrabbiato con il no della Merkel sia alla proposta degli E-Bond di Tremonti e Juncker sia a quella di Strauss Kahn e Trichet per l'ampliamento del meccanismo di salvataggio europeo, giustamente Platero osserva come la "divergenza transatlantica" raggiunge un punto di svolta: l'America si muove, l'Europa sta ferma. Secondo Platero la differenza principale è nel tentativo della politica U.S.A. di anticipare e governare il ciclo economico. Platero vede un legame tra la decisione di fine agosto della Fed di lanciare una seconda fase di Quantitative Easing e l'accordo bipartisan di qualche giorno fa per prolungare i tagli di Bush. Conclude infatti in questo modo il suo articolo: C'è una raffinatezza nella combinazione dell'operazione di stimolo americana: i 600 miliardi di dollari che la Fed utilizzerà per interventi sui mercati obbligazionari servivano a tenere i tassi bassi a medio termine. Il QE2 (...) annunciato sei o sette settimane da e preannunciato molto prima sembrava ridondante: i tassi erano comunque bassi, li si voleva abbassare di più? No, era chiaro che con i nuovi 900 miliardi di dollari di riduzioni fiscali accordate il 6 dicembre, ci sarebbero state pressioni al rialzo sui tassi a dieci anni. E dunque la Fed ha giocato d'anticipo. Perchè in Europa non lo facciamo mai?