La fine del mondo dollarocentrico

Il Wall Street Journal ieri ha dedicato un approfondimento ai mercati valutari che si apriva con l'articolo di Barry Eichengreen intitolato Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End. Anche se il dollaro domina il mercato forex (un mercato nel quale ogni giorno avvengono transazioni per un controvalore complessivo di oltre di 4000 miliardi di dollari) i cambiamenti tecnologici, la possibilità che l'euro e, in un futuro prossimo, lo yuan offrano alternative credibili e altrettanto se non più sicure del dollaro causeranno una transizione relativamente rapida (sulla scala dei 5-10 anni) da un mondo dollarocentrico a un mondo in cui più valute competono per la supremazia sul mercato. La visione di Eichengreen non è universalemente condivisa: ad esempio Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff says he thinks the yuan and the dollar could be on a course to be the two major world currencies, a status the two could share possibly for as long as two decades, he says. But during such a period, he adds, the U.S. would likely see a gradual weakening in the extensive benefits it receives from having other countries peg their currencies to the dollar. Among these benefits: confidence in its markets, low interest rates, and less volatility in prices of imports and exports.

Any transfer of reserve status from the dollar to the yuan would likely take most of this century, he says. Meanwhile, he says, the dollar "will remain the reserve currency for some time, but the benefits will diminish." (...)
The current problems facing the European Union and its struggles to keep its own financial house in order highlight the problems with a supranational currency. The debt issues and economic-policy squabbles now plaguing Europe would likely be magnified in times of stress for any international monetary union. "There's just not going to be a global currency that's not identified with a national government," Mr. Rogoff says. "Look at the problems they're having in Europe; think of that on the international level."

Può darsi che Rogoff abbia ragione, nel frattempo basta che la BCE accenni alla possibilità di un rialzo dei tassi perchè il cambio euro/dollaro raggiunga quasi quota 1,4...

Non è l'America a manipolare il cambio: le conseguenze di un'identità contabile.

Leggo spesso il commento di Martin Wolf sul Financial Times. Ieri l'altro ha dedicato un lungo articolo alla querelle sino-americana sui cambi. Secondo Wolf l'insistenza dei paesi con la bilancia commerciale in attivo (Cina, Germania, ecc.) nel sostenere la necessità di politiche fiscali deflazionistiche nei paesi con la bilancia commerciale in passivo (come gli Stati Uniti ma non solo loro...) è una follia e "le conseguenze di questa follia sono ormai evidenti in quanto sta accadando nell'eurozona". La tesi di Wolf si appoggia su argomenti difficili da confutare molto simili alle considerazioni svolte su Alfa o Beta? già qualche tempo fa: il debito di imprese, famiglie e governo sommato al saldo della bilancia commerciale devono necessariamente compensarsi. E' un'identità contabile, non un teorema che si basa su ipotesi che possono essere o non essere verificate. Scrive giustamente Wolf:
The big economic point, however, is that the world needs to manage a post-crisis adjustment, in which capital flows turn around. In essence, this is a real, not a monetary, process. The rich countries cannot productively absorb the flow of capital that used to flow from poor ones. Indeed, they never could. What could not go on now has to change.
To understand why this is urgent, it helps to look at financial balances within deficit economies. In the case of the US, for example, they tell a compelling story. The financial balances (gap between income and spending) of the household, corporate, government and foreign sectors sum to zero. What is revealing is how they do so. 
Se si dà un'occhiata all'evoluzione nel tempo dei quattro termini dell'identità contabile si scopre come fino alla crisi finanziaria il peso del deficit estero U.S.A. fosse stato sopportato in modo condiviso dalle famiglie e dal governo. La crisi ha tuttavia costretto famiglie e imprese a ridurre la spesa con una conseguenza inevitabile:
With foreigners, households and the corporate sector running surpluses, the government ended up in huge deficit (see chart). In my view, the underlying driver was post-crisis cutbacks by the private sector. The fiscal deficit was far more a result of these shifts than a cause.
The crucial point is that the US can reduce its huge fiscal deficits, without pushing the country into a deep slump, if and only if other sectors expand spending, relative to incomes. This is unlikely to happen in the US private sector, to a sufficient extent, though some expansion of investment is plausible. A good part of the needed adjustment must come from expansion of foreign spending relative to income – in other words, a reduction in the structural current account deficit.
This analysis lies behind any discussion of global adjustment.

Le previsioni del Fondo Monetario Internazionale contenute in questo rapporto descrivono uno scenario futuro chiaramente insostenibile, nel quale i deficit del conto delle partite correnti dei paesi nei quali questo deficit è già alto continua ad aumentare fino a tornare a livelli pre-crisi, mentre i surplus degli altri paesi si stabilizza (si veda la seconda delle figure qui sopra). Questo è impossibile e certamente insostenibile, rischia di alimentare delle guerre valutarie senza confini che penalizzerebbero in primis la crescita mondiale, danneggiando anche la Cina.

Wolf però non è pessimista e fa osservare come nella dichiarazione dei leaders dei paesi del G-20 sia scritto che “persistently large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be agreed by our finance ministers and central bank governors, warrant an assessment of their nature and the root causes of impediments to adjustment ... These indicative guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as a mechanism to facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventive and corrective actions.” Spero proprio che abbia ragione.

Gli USA cercano di gonfiare la Cina, la Cina cerca di sgonfiare gli USA, chi vincerà?

Nel suo OpEd oggi Paul Krugman incita il governo americano a percorrere senza indugi la via delle sanzioni commerciali contro la Cina. Com'è nel suo stile non usa mezze parole per sostenerle:

Diplomacy on China’s currency has gone nowhere, and will continue going nowhere unless backed by the threat of retaliation. The hype about trade war is unjustified — and, anyway, there are worse things than trade conflict. In a time of mass unemployment, made worse by China’s predatory currency policy, the possibility of a few new tariffs should be way down on our list of worries. 

Krugman punta il dito sulle restrizioni ai capitali stranieri che non permettono allo yuan di rivalutarsi, al contrario di quanto è accaduto al real brasiliano che si è rivalutato di oltre il 35% dall'inizio del 2010 a oggi.

But China, the largest of these emerging economies, isn’t allowing this natural process to unfold. Restrictions on foreign investment limit the flow of private funds into China; meanwhile, the Chinese government is keeping the value of its currency, the renminbi, artificially low by buying huge amounts of foreign currency, in effect subsidizing its exports. And these subsidized exports are hurting employment in the rest of the world.(...)
China’s government has shown no hint of helpfulness and seems to go out of its way to flaunt its contempt for U.S. negotiators. In June, the Chinese supposedly agreed to allow their currency to move toward a market-determined rate — which, if the example of economies like Brazil is any indication, would have meant a sharp rise in the renminbi’s value. But, as of Thursday, China’s currency had risen about only 2 percent against the dollar — with most of that rise taking place in just the past few weeks, clearly in anticipation of the vote on the Levin bill. 

La legge Levin è stata votata ieri dal Senato U.S.A. e permette, almeno in linea di principio, l'introduzione di tariffe doganali sui beni di importazione dalla Cina. L'effettiva applicazione di dazi sembra però improbabile ma secondo Krugman

The Levin bill is, then, a signal at best — and it’s at least as much a shot across the bow of U.S. officials as it is a signal to the Chinese. But it’s a step in the right direction.


Sulle guerre dei cambi in corso vi segnalo anche il lungo e circostanziato articolo di Martin Wolf sul Financial Times di un paio di giorni fa. Da questo eccellente articolo  ho tratto i grafici che trovate riprodotti  qui sopra. Wolf, al contrario di Krugman, è forse un po' troppo gentile con la Cina, attribuendo la manipolazione cinese esclusivamente alla paura di ripetere la fine del Giappone, che subì un'impressionante bolla immobiliare e azionaria dopo l'accordo al Plaza Hotel di New York nel settembre del 1985 nel quale le sei maggiori potenze economiche dell'epoca (USA, Giappone, Germania, Francia, Regno Unito e ... Italia) si accordarono per una svalutazione del dollaro. La situazione attuale è ben riassunta da Wolf così:

In the absence of currency adjustments, we are seeing a form of monetary warfare: in effect, the US is seeking to inflate China, and China to deflate the US. Both sides are convinced they are right; neither is succeeding; and the rest of the world suffers. 

Consoliamoci: meglio la guerra dei cambi della guerra, o no?

La sospetta debolezza del dollaro e il promettente futuro dell'argento

L'andamento sempre più caotico del mercato valutario non finisce di stupirmi e di affascinarmi. Secondo la newsletter settimanale di forex.com ci sono buone ragioni per diffidare della debolezza che il dollaro ha mostrato la scorsa settimana:

USD weakness looks suspect
The USD took a hit in the past week as better Chinese data supported global recovery prospects, weakening safe haven dollar demand, and markets responded to talk the Fed may undertake a second round of quantitative easing (QE). The greenback also likely weakened as the Chinese stepped back from dollar-buying intervention and allowed the RMB to strengthen. The Chinese data suggest a soft-landing has been achieved there and that is indeed supportive for the global outlook, and especially for commodity and regional currencies (e.g. AUD in particular) that benefit from Chinese growth. However, the other developments cited above are likely temporary in nature, suggesting potential for the USD to rebound in coming weeks. The talk of additional Fed QE seems premature given the split among FOMC members, with most content to maintain current policy and others openly questioning the effectiveness of QE. While US data has deteriorated, it does not yet reflect the 'appreciably' worse outlook Fed Chair Bernanke has indicated would be the trigger for additional unconventional policy measures. Judging by recent FOMC minutes, the subject of QE has barely been discussed, much less settled, so the prospect for additional asset purchases at this time seems highly remote. As such, USD weakness may dissipate following the FOMC meeting next Tuesday (Sept. 21). USD weakness emanating from China stepping back from managing the Yuan (RMB) seems similarly set to evaporate if they return to pattern (see more below).
To gauge the potential for a USD rebound, we will closely monitor the 1.2920/50 support level in EUR/USD, which was the recent range high and the break-level for recent EUR gains, and upside potential remains while price holds above. Keep in mind the German ZEW economic sentiment gauge has plunged from +53.0 in April to -4.3 in September, an indication of deteriorating 6-month outlooks. If EUR/USD does drop back below the range break at 1.2920/50, we would anticipate a test of prior range lows around 1.2590/2620 at the minimum, and very likely a break below toward 1.2450/80 initially. Convincing strength above 1.3150/60 will be needed to mount a challenge to recent 1.3330 highs and test the psychological 1.3500 level next.

Secondo il Wall Street Journal uno dei fattori che hanno pesato sulle scelte degli investitori è l'attesa per la riunione della Fed prevista per martedì prossimo. Ma  tutte le valute principali hanno problemi evidenti che le portano a indebolirsi a turno:



"We are in a very unusual environment, where the [four most widely traded] currencies all look like dogs, really," said Alan Ruskin, global head of Group of 10 foreign-exchange strategy at Deutsche Bank in New York.
Each is burdened by country-specific factors: the dollar because of the prospect of further quantitative easing, the yen because of downside risk if the Japanese central bank steps into markets again, the pound due to a string of data disappointments, and the euro due to stubborn sovereign-debt worries.(...)
"It's a tough trading environment. People are going to be looking further afield as to where to put on risk," Mr. Ruskin said.
The Australian dollar stands out as one likely beneficiary of moves away from the dollar, euro and yen. Emerging-market currencies in Asia and Latin America also stand to gain.


L'alternativa: le valute del passato, oro e argento, che registrano in questi giorni nuovi massimi:
Certainly, the rise in gold and silver prices could hardly be attributed to worries about near-term inflation. Friday's consumer-price report came in weaker than expected, and showed core inflation rates running at 44-year lows. Rather, the rally, particularly in the past month, seems to be keying off the prospect of further policy easing from the Federal Reserve precisely because of weak inflation rates and tepid economic growth.
While it isn't certain that the Fed will introduce additional "quantitative easing" measures at its next policy meeting on Tuesday, the likelihood of further intervention in the months ahead has grown. That's likely to keep downward pressure on the U.S. dollar, and benefit "monetary substitutes such as precious metals, art and other collectibles," says Scott Minerd, chief investment officer at Guggenheim Partners.
The biggest risk for silver and gold bugs is that the outlook for U.S. economic growth stabilizes, and the dollar does too. Yet silver, unlike gold, also has industrial uses in electronics, solar energy, medical devices and increasingly popular radio-frequency identification, or RFID, tags. And while gold is already a common holding among hedge funds and some institutions, silver holdings are still pretty rare.
Silver may not be heading back for its record high levels of around $50 an ounce, but it probably has room to run before the rally tarnishes.

 

Ancora sul cambio yuan/dollaro. I rendimenti del primo semestre 2010. Aggiornamento al 25 giugno 2010.

La (relativa) liberalizzazione del cambio dello yuan cinese è stata discussa in numerosissimi articoli questa settimana. Se l'argomento non vi è ancora venuto a noia potete leggere:

• il commento di Paul Krugman sul New York Times: non va tanto per il sottile il nostro Paul che conclude la sua analisi invocando sanzioni contro l'export cinese. Krugman denuncia la malafede cinese: In fact, far from representing a step in the right direction, the Chinese announcement was an exercise in bad faith — an attempt to exploit U.S. restraint. To keep the rhetorical temperature down, the Obama administration has used diplomatic language in its efforts to persuade the Chinese government to end its bad behavior. Now the Chinese have responded by seizing on the form of American language to avoid dealing with the substance of American complaints. In short, they’re playing games. Secondo Krugman la Cina ha artificialmente depresso il cambio in questi anni tanto è vero che the central bank is accumulating so many dollars, euros and other foreign assets — more than $2 trillion worth so far. Così facendo favorisce l'esportazione e protegge il mercato interno dalle importazioni, danneggiando l'economia mondiale e mettendone in pericolo la ripresa. La cosa è particolarmente grave in questo momento di debolezza della domanda: In normal times, you could argue that Chinese purchases of U.S. bonds, while distorting trade, were at least supplying us with cheap credit — and you could argue that it wasn’t China’s fault that we used that credit to inflate a vast, destructive housing bubble. But right now we’re awash in cheap credit; what’s lacking is sufficient demand for goods and services to generate the jobs we need. And China, by running an artificial trade surplus, is aggravating that problem. (...) Well, China has allowed the renminbi to rise — but barely. As of Thursday, the currency was only about half a percent higher than its typical level before the announcement. And all indications are that watching the future movement of the renminbi will be like watching paint dry: Chinese officials are still making statements denying that a rise in their currency will do anything to reduce trade imbalances, and prices in the forward market, in which traders agree to exchange currencies at various points in the future, suggest a rise of only about 2 percent in the renminbi by the end of this year. This is basically a joke. (...) what America, and the world, wants (and has the right to demand): a much stronger renminbi. Having the currency bob up or down slightly makes no difference to the fundamentals. So what comes next? China’s government is clearly trying to string the rest of us along, putting off action until something — it’s hard to say what — comes up.
  That’s not acceptable. China needs to stop giving us the runaround and deliver real change. And if it refuses, it’s time to talk about trade sanctions. 
•  Secondo gli analisti di Forbes, collaboratori dell'Economonitor promosso da Nouriel Roubini, uno yuan più forte dovrebbe sostenere gli asset rischiosi: We expect China to allow a modest and nominal appreciation against the USD of no more than 4% on an annual basis in the next year. Yet even though we expect gradualism and caution from the PBoC, we predict global markets--and particularly risk assets and proxies for China revaluation, especially in Emerging Market Asia--will react positively to the move in the short-term. Ma non mancano le ambiguità e le preoccupazioni: The uncertainty could provide the PBoC greater discretion to manage the CNY's real effective exchange rate, albeit at the cost of some autonomy in monetary policy. The longer-term effect could well be a paradoxical eventual depreciation against the USD, which would help offset the competitiveness losses from the recent sharp fall in the EUR. After all, the euro zone is China's largest export destination. 
•  Infine vi segnalo l'analisi dell'Economist così come l'approfondimento sulle prospettive future del cambio dollaro/yuan: The last time the central bank let the currency crawl, it clambered up by 21% against the dollar over three years. But it may not match that pace this time. China will not want the yuan to get too far ahead of other significant currencies that may be falling against the dollar. As the central bank says, China now has a “long and diversified” list of trading partners. Against a broad basket of their currencies, the yuan has already risen this year; against the euro it has strengthened by 17%. On any given day the yuan may also slip, as well as climb, against the dollar. The central bank is keen to deter “hot money” that might seep past the country’s capital controls, looking to profit from a stronger currency. Mark Williams of Capital Economics, a research firm, thinks it has already succeeded. The currency forwards market expects the yuan to appreciate by only 2.2% over the next 12 months, a slender return given the hassle of getting money in and out of China.
  
  

Due parole sulla performance dei segnali in questo primo semestre: un portafoglio equipesato concentrato nei primi 3 asset della classifica settimanale e settimanalmente ribilanciato ha  reso l'8.1% da inizio anno, con un drawdown massimo (calcolato sulle chiusure settimanali) inferiore al 5%. Restringendo la scelta ai primi due asset il rendimento cala leggermente al 6.9%. Non troppo male in un anno che finora ha visto i principali indici azionari europei andare in rosso. Ecco la tabella tratta dal Il Sole 24 Ore Plus con i rendimenti dei fondi di investimento divisi per categoria. Gli indici bilanciati hanno reso da inizio anno poco meno del 2%.

Ecco l'aggiornamento al 25 giugno 2010.

Bailouts senza fondo. La rivalutazione del cambio yuan/dollaro

Quanto costerà ai contribuenti USA il salvataggio di Freddie Mac e Fannie Mae? Le ultime stime si aggirano intorno ai 400 miliardi di dollari ma c'è chi prospetta anche cifre superiori.
Secondo l'analista e blogger di MSN Money Jim Jubak le cose potrbbero anche mettersi molto peggio:
In August, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated the two companies would need $389 billion in government money through 2019. Barclays Capital said in December that the price tag could run as high as $500 billion if housing prices dropped an additional 20%. (Housing prices as measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller 20-city index fell 3.2% in the first quarter of 2010 compared with the previous quarter.)

Sean Egan, the president of Egan-Jones Ratings, recently told Bloomberg that a 20% loss on mortgages and guarantees, which is in line with the losses at a mortgage lender such as Countrywide Financial -- now owned by Bank of America (BAC, news, msgs) -- could take a worst-case scenario to $1 trillion.

No one knows the exact number, but there's an awful lot of taxpayer money riding on housing prices.

The obligations are real, but none of it is in the federal budget. How long will the foreign money financing the U.S. deficit buy that one, do you think?

Jubak considera l'esplosione del bailout di Fannie e Freddie uno dei principali rischi di breve-medio termine per la ripresa dell'economia USA e mondiale, insieme all'aggravarsi della crisi del debito spagnolo e al rischio insolvenza del sistema bancario cinese. 

Come ho già anticipato ieri la banca centrale cinese ha annunciato la sua disponibilità a una maggiore flessibilità del cambio dello yuan. Ecco quanto scrive oggi il New York Times:

China announced on Saturday evening that it would allow greater flexibility in the value of its currency, a move that could deflect growing international criticism of its economic policies and defuse one of the greatest sources of tension between Beijing and Washington.

The statement, by China’s central bank, was the clearest sign yet that the country would allow its currency to appreciate gradually against the dollar. World leaders are due to meet next week in Canada for economic talks, and China’s currency policies had appeared a certain source of conflict.
The United States has been leading a chorus of countries urging China to let its currency fluctuate. Many members of Congress believe China’s exchange rate policy gives it an unfair trade advantage, and a movement has been growing to take retaliatory trade action if China did not make an adjustment.
President Obama and the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, immediately praised China’s action. “China’s decision to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate is a constructive step that can help safeguard the recovery and contribute to a more balanced global economy,” Mr. Obama said in a statement. The European Commission also said it supported the move.
But it remains to be seen whether the move will significantly rebalance the global trade picture. The People’s Bank of China was cautious in its statement about how far its currency, the renminbi, might fluctuate, warning explicitly that “the basis for large-scale appreciation of the RMB exchange rate does not exist.” Chinese officials said the renminbi would move in relation to an unspecified basket of currencies, not just the dollar. Experts said that depending on how the system was designed, China could avoid rapid fluctuations.
Mr. Geithner alluded to this in a statement, saying, “This is an important step, but the test will be how far and how fast they let the currency appreciate.”
The first sign of how much currency appreciation will be tolerated is likely to come Monday morning, when the Chinese government will set the initial trading band for the value of the renminbi in Shanghai trading.
China has kept its currency value low since mid-2008 by pegging it to that of the dollar and not letting it fluctuate. Any trend in the renminbi’s value would have been higher without the peg, making China’s goods more expensive to foreign consumers and possibly slowing the country’s export-based economy.(...)
For China, a stronger renminbi will increase the buying power of its consumers and could make gasoline and other imported commodities seem less expensive. Faced with spreading labor unrest, particularly in the auto industry, the government has started to make an energetic effort to improve the standard of living of industrial workers.
But many economists inside and outside China have argued that currency appreciation is in China’s interest most of all. The country has been spending nearly one-tenth of its annual economic output to buy Treasury notes and bonds and other foreign securities while printing and selling renminbi, all in an effort to prevent the renminbi from rising against the dollar.
The renminbi has already risen with the dollar by 15 percent against the euro in the last two months. That has made Chinese officials nervous about the future competitiveness of Chinese sales to Europe, the biggest market for Chinese exports.
Cui Tiankai, a vice foreign minister, said on Friday that the value of the renminbi was not a subject for global discussion, the latest in a series of remarks by Chinese officials indicating strong nationalistic sensitivities about currency policy.
But people familiar with Chinese currency policy making have been saying for two months that the Chinese leadership agreed in early April to a change of direction. A devastating earthquake in western China in mid-April followed by worries about economic turmoil in Europe delayed action on the decision.