La sconfitta degli Austeriani e il ritorno della crisi dell'Eurozona.

Wolfgang Munchau sul Financial Times di questa mattina conclude così (profeticamente) il suo articolo dedicato alle politiche (sbagliate) di austerità attuate in Europa 

I am not surprised that European electorates are rejecting these policies, and the politicians who delivered them. Tonight we will know how Italy has voted. My hunch is that it is not going to be a good evening for the “Austerians”.

Beh è andata proprio così, e non era poi difficile da prevedere. L'articolo di Munchau è davvero da leggere, ad esempio sottolinea il danno procurato dalla disoccupazione prolungata proprio sui giovani 

...austerity – higher 

taxes and cuts in public sector 

investments – weaken the economy’s 

capacity in the short run, and 

possibly also in the long run. If you 

have youth unemployment of more 

than 50 per cent for a sustained 

period, as is now the case in Greece, 

Italy and Spain, many of those 

people will never find good jobs in 

their lives. Economists speak of a socalled 

“hysteresis” effect – 

permanent economic damage that 

will not be repaired even if there is a 

full recovery. Austerity could well 

leave an economic and social scar 

across the eurozone. 

Italy and Spain would have been a

lot better off to come up with a list 

of front-loaded targeted structural 

reforms and backloaded fiscal

consolidation. When you do it the 

other way round, cutting investment 

and raising taxes in a recession, you 

never get out of the hole, and you 

waste your political capital on 

austerity, leaving none for reforms.

Con i risultati delle elezioni in Italia che si annunciavano molto diversi da quanto anticipato dagli exit polls alla chiusura dei seggi i mercati hanno tutti innescato la marcia indietro: oltre ai movimenti dei mercati azionari è da sottolineare il crollo dell'euro, che in mattinata e nel primo pomeriggio era risalito fino a 1,33 ma che rapidamente dopo le prime proiezioni è sceso fino a 1,305, un movimento del 2% in poche ore.
Per chi pensava che la crisi dell'eurozona fosse ormai dietro le spalle si è trattato di un brusco risveglio. Dall'altra parte dell'oceano in molti se lo aspettavano, basta dare un'occhiata alla prima pagina del Wall Street Journal Europe di oggi. 

Il contagio da Atene a Parigi passando per Madrid

L'ultimo commento settimanale di John Mauldin non lascia molto spazio all'ottimismo sugli sbocchi dell'eurocrisi: secondo l'analista americano Spanish banks will require an estimated 100 billion-250 billion euros in recapitalization

later this year to reach this capital ratio target – a significant percentage of which will have to be

shouldered by Madrid. (source: Stratfor) con un innalzamento del rapporto debito/GDP del 25% solo nel 2012. Aggiungendo le garanzie implicite nei vari fondi creati per il bailout della Grecia e il sostegno di Irlanda e Portogallo il rapporto debito/GDP spagnolo raddoppia: As near as I can tell, Spain is guaranteeing about $20 billion of the new IMF funds that will be used for a European bailout. Spain already has $332 billion of liabilities to the ECB, $125 billion to the stabilization fund, another $99 billion for something called the Macro Financial Asset Fund, and various guarantees for other bank and European funds, all of which totals over $600 billion, give or take. Their public debt-to-GDP ratio is only 69%, but add in these other guarantees and commitments and you get over 130% debt-to-GDP. And that is before they start bailing out their banks, and before any additional debt from their fiscal deficit, which is running at 8%.

La situazione della Francia, quando si tiene conto degli impegni presi, non è molto migliore: France’s acknowledged, official debt to-GDP is 86%; but when you include their various commitments to the ECB, the ESFS, ESM, EIB, etc., the number rises to about 146%. Not all of that requires France to make the interest payments, but just to cover any losses in case of a default. But that 86% number is rising rather rapidly. Ed è un paese che non pareggia il bilancio dal 1974 (vedi sopra) e le banche, anche se in condizioni migliori di quelle spagnole, hanno un peso molto forte sull'economia, e un'esposizione ai PIIGS non trascurabile: A default by Spain would push them (and a lot of other European banks) over the edge. Which is one reason that Sarkozy was so loudly insistent that any bank problems should be treated as a European problem and not the problem of the host country. (Interesting idea if you are Irish!) France simply cannot afford to deal with any problems in its banks while it is running such large deficits. And not while it is guaranteeing all sorts of European debt, which is at the heart of the problem. Germany needs France to help shoulder the financial burdens of Europe. And as long as France can keep its AAA rating, Germany has a partner. But if France loses that rating, then any European debt it guarantees clearly loses that rating as well. (e i mercati da tempo hanno tolto la AAA alla Francia, almeno se si guarda alla dinamica dei CDS e dello spread OTA-Bund, più dettagli sulla questione in un post nel futuro prossimo, ispirato da un articoletto sul quale sto lavorando insieme a un paio di colleghi).

S&P has already taken France down one notch to AA+ and still has a negative outlook. Moody’s has warned of a possible downgrade to France. Italy now has a BBB+ rating, just below that of Spain. When you look at the actual balance sheet and total debt, France is not all that far from further downgrades, unless it embraces a new budget ethic, which is precisely what Hollande has said he will not do.

That would be a real crisis for the eurozone. German voters might not be willing to  shoulder the European burden without a full partner in France. And if France had to guarantee a great deal more pan-European debt, while it continued to run deficits and, God forbid, had a crisis in one or more of its banks, it would be putting its credit rating at risk.

Comunque voi la pensiate, mi sembra difficile non trovarsi d'accordo con le conclusioni di Mauldin: la Grecia uscirà dall'euro, forse accompagnata dal Portogallo, chissà cosa accadrà all'Irlanda ma la Spagna, beh è un po' diverso... Spain is too big to save and too big to fail. The only way for Spanish debt to remain at 6% is for the ECB to basically buy it (or lend to Spanish banks so they can buy it, or whatever creative new program Draghi and team can think up). When Spain goes, it is just a matter of time before we lose Italy and then, yes, even France. The line must be drawn with Spain. And the only outfit with a balance sheet big enough that can also do it in a politically acceptable manner is the ECB, and the only way they can do it is with a printing press.

Ora c'è solo da sperare che non ci si mettano le banche americane (e magari anche tedesche o inglesi) con le loro operazioni di trading - scusate intendevo dire hedging, naturalmente - a rendere le cose ancora peggiori...

La bolla immobiliare in Spagna

La dimensione della bolla immobiliare spagnola, relativamente alla ricchezza e alla popolazione, è impressionante e fa sembrare la bolla USA una bazzeccola: guardate i grafici in questo post

The Pain in Spain

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Uno spread che non cala.

Uno spread che non cala (da lavoce.info): BTP-Bonos spagnoli. La piccola diminuzione subito prima del varo della manovra è l'intervento coordinato delle banche centrali della settimana scorsa che ha considerevolmente ridotto lo spread sul Bund sia di BTP che di Bonos.La figura è di un paio di giorni fa, mentre vi scrivo lo spread è poco inferiore ai 60 p.b. dunque leggermente in calo rispetto a quello della figura, ma ancora molto lontano dai valori negativi di fine giugno.

Analisi, psicoanalisi e la casalinga di Treviso

Il New York Times dedica un articolo di analisi alla Spagna, da più parti indicata come il prossimo paese che avrà bisogno di aiuti, insieme al Portogallo:

Spain joined Greece and Portugal last week in being downgraded by Standard & Poor’s, the rating agency. While Spain remains well above the junk level S.& P. gave to Greece and ahead of Portugal’s A- rating, its fall from AA+ to AA was a blow.
Among the reasons for its decision, S.& P. highlighted Spain’s private sector indebtedness of 178 percent of G.D.P. and an inflexible labor market that was likely to leave Spain with a jobless rate of 21 percent this year.
To date, Mr. Zapatero’s policies have rested on the hope that the economy would begin to recover soon and that the jobless rate would average no more than 19 percent this year.
Yet the jobless rate has already reached 20 percent, according to government statistics for the first quarter released Friday, almost double the level when Spain’s recession began in 2008. (...)
But now investors are turning their skepticism to Spain as the weakest spots in the country’s economy show little sign of improvement.
In a research note last week, analysts at Credit Suisse argued that beyond agreeing on a multiyear rescue package for Greece, Europe needed to set up standby arrangements for Spain and Portugal, allowing them to “fund their ongoing budget deficits while carrying out tough fiscal adjustment programs.”


Continuano a proliferare le (psico)analisi dei tedeschi e della loro reazione alla crisi e al bailout della Grecia:

qualche giorno fa vi segnalavo un articolo sul Sole 24 Ore, ieri era il turno del New York Times che titolava  In Greek Debt Crisis, a Window to the German Psyche. Scopro così la traduzione tedesca della casalinga di Treviso: 
“One should simply have asked a Swabian housewife,” Mrs. Merkel said during an address to fellow Christian Democrats in December 2008 in the southwest German region of Swabia, hub of the Protestant work ethic. “She would have told us her worldly wisdom: in the long run, you can’t live beyond your means.”




Non c'è poi da stupirsi se i tedeschi hanno scelto Angela Merkel come primo ministro: scrive ancora il NYTimes che incentra la (psico)analisi comparata sul confronto Germania/Francia:


Mrs. Merkel, a physicist raised in communist East Germany, has a hard-working, parsimonious lifestyle and an analytical, somewhat bland personality that in many ways reflect the national value system, said Gerd Langguth, author of a 2005 biography of her.
While Mr. Sarkozy resides in the majestic Élysée Palace and has an army of staff members, Mrs. Merkel still lives in the central Berlin apartment she occupied before her election in 2005 and has been seen doing her own shopping.

Grecia, Portogallo e Spagna sotto pressione.

Oggi vi segnalo:

un video del Financial Times sull'aggravarsi della crisi dopo i downgrades del debito greco e portoghese da parte di Standard and Poors.

Un articolo dell'Economist che cerca di spiegare perchè secondo molti analisti la prima vittima del contagio dovrebbe proprio essere il Portogallo. Scrive l'Economist:

One answer is that Portugal’s biggest problem is not primarily fiscal. It concerns growth—or the lack of it. Real GDP growth over the decade since Portugal joined the euro has been the slowest in the zone, despite a boom in Spain, its main trading partner. The country avoided a property bubble of the kind that burst so disastrously in Spain and Ireland. Though it doesn’t help much, Portugal’s already slow growth also made it less vulnerable to the global recession. “Spain was the wild tiger of Europe and had much further to fall when the recession came,” says João Talone, a private-equity manager. “Portuguese companies were already used to extracting value in a difficult climate.”  (...) 

A slow-moving bureaucracy, inefficient courts, poor schools and state-supported pockets of the economy protected from competition combine to hold Portugal back. Businessmen moan about rigid labour laws, which there is little political will to reform. Portugal has one of Europe’s toughest employee-protection regimes.

In short, Portugal is indeed different from Greece. But if the markets decided to put this to the test, chronic low growth, a drastic loss of competitiveness and high public and private indebtedness are all weaknesses which could swiftly undermine the protection that being different is meant to bring.

Infine un articolo del New York TImes ancora sulla Grecia e sulle conseguenze del downgrade. Scrive il NYTimes:

A major ratings agency cut Greece’s debt to junk level on Tuesday, warning that bondholders could face losses of up to 50 percent of their holdings in a restructuring. The agency also downgraded Portugal’s debt by two notches.

Leading stock indexes across Europe plunged by 2.5 to 6 percent, and the euro fell to a recent low, for a 13 percent decline against the dollar since December. The Dow Jones industrial average slumped 213.04 points, to 10,991.99, a fall of 1.9 percent.

The downgrades, by Standard & Poor’s, pushed up the interest rates that Portugal must pay on its 10-year bonds to a high, and Spain’s costs rose, too. Investors are already demanding nearly 10 percent in returns on Greek’s 10-year bonds. The cost of insuring all three countries’ debt against a default are also at record levels — a clear sign that investors are shunning them.

“The situation is deteriorating rapidly, and it’s not clear who’s in a position to stop the Greeks from going into a default situation,” said Edward Yardeni, president of Yardeni Research. “That creates a spillover effect.”

The problem is that it is not just Greece, which expects to receive international aid, but Portugal, Spain and other countries that must issue more debt soon.

“The issue is rollover risk," said Jonathan Tepper of Variant Perception, a research group based in London and known for its bearish views on Spain. "Spain has to issue new debt plus roll over existing debt to the tune of 225 billion euros this year. Fourty-five percent of their debt is held by foreigners so they are dependent on the kindness of strangers.”

(...) On Tuesday, a vice president of the European Central Bank said that the euro zone was facing its biggest challenge since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1997. Austerity measures in Greece and Portugal are already causing unrest there. Transportation workers in both countries protested on Tuesday, leaving train stations deserted because of strikes.

Officials from Standard & Poor’s said the main reason for downgrading the debt of Greece and Portugal was the prospect that forced austerity packages would be an even bigger drag on economic growth.

It is the most vicious of circles: stagnating economies are forced to cut back more, which reduces their ability to generate revenue and thus pay off their debts. As part of the euro zone, these countries do not have the ability to print their own money to stimulate growth and bolster exports, so increasing debt and an increasing prospect of default result.

Though they are under the most immediate pressure, Greece and Portugal are relatively small economies.

Given Spain’s size, its debt crisis is seen by many as the looming problem for world markets. On the surface, its debt load appears manageable. Its debt relative to gross domestic product, the broadest measure of its economy, is 54 percent — compared with 120 percent for Greece and 80 percent for Portugal.

But what Spain does have is the highest twin deficit, or combined budget and current account deficits, of any country in the world except Iceland, a reflection of how dependent it is on increasingly fickle foreign investors for financing. Spain has 225 billion euros in debt coming due this year — an amount that is about the size of Greece’s economy.

The base of investors willing to invest in the bonds of Spain and other distressed European countries is dwindling. Mohamed El-Erian, the chief executive of Pimco, one of the largest bond investors in the world, has said publicly that his firm is not a buyer of Greek debt and other Pimco executives have said they are underweight debt from peripheral Europe.

Given the losses that European investors have taken on Greek, Spanish and Portuguese bonds in recent months, it seems doubtful that such investors can be relied on to provide the capital these countries need.

Predicting where and when the next ripple will be felt is an inexact science. During the Asian crisis in 1997, Russia’s debt default took the world by surprise.

Some even worry that the next debt crisis may materialize closer to home — in the United Kingdom or even the United States, where budget deficits and debt burdens are growing. Both countries are now issuing debt at reasonable levels of 4 percent. The long run of cheap financing may be coming to an end, though, even for the most creditworthy countries.