Forse l'Italia dovrebbe ristrutturare il proprio debito

Questa è l'opinione di Nouriel Roubini espressa ieri sul Financial Times (potete leggere l'articolo qui). Ecco qui l'incipit, che ha dalla sua parte una logica difficilmente discutibile:

Some influential figures in Italy have suggested a capital levy, or wealth tax, could achieve the same reduction in public debt. But a debt restructuring is superior. To reduce the debt ratio to 90 per cent of GDP, a wealth tax would need to raise €450bn (30 per cent of GDP). Even if payment of such a levy were spread over a decade that would imply an increase in taxes equivalent to three per cent of GDP for ten years running; the resulting drop in disposable income and consumption would make Italy’s recession a depression.

It is increasingly clear that Italy’s public debt is unsustainable and needs an orderly restructuring to avert a disorderly default. The eurozone’s wish to exclude private sector involvement from the design of the new European Stability Mechanism is pig-headed – and lacks all credibility.

With public debt at 120 per cent of gross domestic product, real interest rates close to five per cent and zero growth, Italy would need a primary surplus of five per cent of gross domestic product – not the current near-zero – merely to stabilise its debt. Soon real rates will be higher and growth negative. Moreover, the austerity that the European Central Bank and Germany are imposing on Italy will turn recession into depression.

Secondo Roubini è ormai chiaro che nel caso si materializzasse l'ipotesi di un prestatore di ultima istanza questo si troverebbe sommerso di vendite di obbligazioni del Tesoro (non usa mezzi termini, la sottolineatura è mia):

Even if austerity and reforms were eventually to restore debt sustainability, Italy and countries in a similar position would need a lender of last resort to support them and prevent sovereign spreads exploding while they regained market credibility. But Italy’s financing needs for the next twelve months alone are not confined to the €400bn of debt maturing. At this point most investors would dump their entire holdings of Italian debt to any sucker – the ECB, European Financial Stability Facility, IMF or whoever – willing to buy it at current yields. If a lender of last resort appears, Italy’s entire debt stock of €1,900bn will be soon supplied.

Secondo Roubini la ristrutturazione del debito è preferibile a una patrimoniale forte che accentuerebbe la recessione (inevitabile) trasformandola in una depressione: 

Some influential figures in Italy have suggested a capital levy, or wealth tax, could achieve the same reduction in public debt. But a debt restructuring is superior. To reduce the debt ratio to 90 per cent of GDP, a wealth tax would need to raise €450bn (30 per cent of GDP). Even if payment of such a levy were spread over a decade that would imply an increase in taxes equivalent to three per cent of GDP for ten years running; the resulting drop in disposable income and consumption would make Italy’s recession a depression.

La sfiducia dei mercati è tangibile: i tassi dei BTp in asta ieri sono altissimi e la probabilità condizionata di default implicita nelle quotazioni dei CDS sul debito sovrano italiano è quadruplicata negli ultimi sei mesi come mostra la figura qui accanto tratta da un articolo di Manasse e Triglia su La Voce.