Cosa unisce la crisi finanziaria con la rivolta di Londra?

E' il tema affrontato da George Friedman in questo video Agenda: With George Friedman on a Crisis of Political Economy

L'analista americano non usa mezze parole e sostiene a chiare lettere che c'è un legame tra la crisi di legittimità delle elites finanziarie e politiche e la rivolta di Londra. Ho evidenziato in rosso alcune frasi particolarmente esplicite: 

In fact, the riots in London are kind of symptomatic of this, of the fact that some elements of society have lost such respect for the elites that they’re prepared to take extreme action. (...)
Normally, just because you cut benefits, you don’t have these kind of riots. And many of these rioters were not rioting because they were planning on going to university and weren’t going to get an opportunity to do so. You had a great deal of criminality in this and that criminality is interesting because when criminality starts to look legitimate to large numbers of people, that’s when you have a social crisis. I think it’s a mistake to look at what happened in London simply in terms of “well there were social cuts and so that’s why there was a rising.” That rising couldn’t have occurred if the elites themselves hadn’t appeared to be so corrupted, so compromised, and even one could say, so incompetent. That was the real issue that we faced there and I think if you simply say that if you do social cuts then people will riot, that’s not empirically true. It’s when you wind up in a situation where you no longer know who’s in charge nor do you care, that opportunities are created for the criminal class. Far more interesting, the rioters have been the people in London, some of them, who have justified the riots. I’m not saying that as a moral category, justified or not. What’s interesting is that it is not a universal condemnation.

Secondo Friedman l'origine della delegittimazione delle elites è chiara: 

You have to look at the more fundamental issue. People who were supposed to be experts in finance did inexcusably stupid things and also in the process, profited handsomely. People in the political system who were supposed to hold these people accountable and prevent them from doing these things, failed to do it. I think in most countries we expect our politicians to steal a little money here and there on expense accounts, we expect bickering in Congress — we expect these things. But when the fundamental thing that legitimizes an elite, the financial elite’s ability to manage money prudently, is violated in two ways. First, that they clearly can’t do it. And secondly that they profit from it anyway. And when the politicians’ obligation to stabilize the system and not let people get away with this doesn’t happen, you have serious problems. So I think the problem really starts with the systemic failure of two major elites, not on minor things, not on trivial corruption, but on the fundamental thing that they were hired for. And the fact that they don’t seem to regard themselves as particularly having failed. I mean, this is what creates a crisis I think.

(...) So we have a crisis I think, not in corruption, but of sheer incompetence and indifference to incompetence, and that is something that is not necessarily unmanageable, but it’s certainly not a question of getting better regulations.