giovedì 15 aprile 2010

Un po' di respiro ma poi?

Una limpida analisi dell'Economist appena uscito mostra come il bailout della Grecia serva soprattutto a guadagnare tempo, e tira in ballo direttamente l'Italia:

(...) The bail-out, which was certainly bigger than the markets had expected, has all but eliminated the risk of default this year. But Greece still faces a deep medium-term solvency crisis. Anyone who looks hard at Greece’s debts and the interest rate it is paying on them can only conclude that, unless growth rebounds unexpectedly strongly, an eventual restructuring of Greek debt remains highly likely (see article). The rescue package has merely bought time—three years, in effect, to contain the adverse consequences of a possible Greek default.

Grim figures

Begin with the numbers. Greece’s medium-term debt outlook is darker than either its government or the EU admits. This newspaper’s calculations suggest that even with a fiscal adjustment worth 10% of GDP over the next five years, Greece will either need more official loans for longer than the current rescue package promises or will have to “restructure” its debts (ie, defer payment on some loans or pay back less than it owes). Even on optimistic assumptions, we reckon Greece will need €67 billion or more of long-term official loans in the next few years. Its debt burden will peak at 150% of GDP in 2014, a level exceeded now only by Japan. If growth turns out to be weaker than expected, or Greece fails to cut spending or raise taxes enough, the figures will be a lot worse.
Such a sombre conclusion invites the question of whether this week’s bail-out makes any sense. After all, the history of emerging-market debt crises, especially Argentina’s in 2001, suggests that, if default is overwhelmingly likely, it is better to get it over with rather than put it off with quixotic rescue packages. But this is not true in the Greek case, for two reasons that have less to do with Greece than with the rest of the euro area.
First, a Greek default now would carry a serious risk of triggering debt crises in Portugal, Spain and even Italy, the other euro-area countries suffering from some combination of big budget deficits, poor growth prospects and high debt burdens. The EU does not have the firepower to cope with these.
Second, a default now could also have calamitous effects on the fragile European banking system. Euro-area banks hold €120 billion of exposure to Greece, of which we reckon perhaps €70 billion is Greek sovereign debt. French and German banks account for 40% of the total. Many European banks might well require more government help if they lost a lot on Greek debt. Indeed, the sums involved might easily be greater than the German and French contributions to the Greek rescue loans. And if contagion then pushed Spain and Portugal to a crisis, the entire European banking system could implode.

Sono in molti a chiedersi se il contenimento della crisi funzionerà: secondo il Wall Street Journal 

 Analysts at data firm Markit and French bank BNP Paribas are warning today about jitters in the European debt markets spreading from Greece to other fiscally-stretched euro nations like Portugal and Spain. The folks at Italian bank UniCredit, however, aren’t so sure.

Intanto l'economia cinese cresce al ritmo di quasi il 12% e rende la rivalutazione dello yuan praticamente inevitabile

L'intervista che qualche giorno fa Consuelo Mack ha fatto a Christopher Davis, un investitore value di terza generazione, copre molti dei punti fondamentali di questo approccio alla costruzione di un portafoglio.

Per chi poi fosse alla caccia di idee per il trading vi segnalo questo post su Seekingalpha:
Lunghi sull'argento e corti sulle obbligazioni del Tesoro USA?

1 commento:

gg ha detto...

l'idea di andare lungo sull'argento la trovo davvero arguta.