domenica 27 giugno 2010

Ancora sul cambio yuan/dollaro. I rendimenti del primo semestre 2010. Aggiornamento al 25 giugno 2010.

La (relativa) liberalizzazione del cambio dello yuan cinese è stata discussa in numerosissimi articoli questa settimana. Se l'argomento non vi è ancora venuto a noia potete leggere:
  • il commento di Paul Krugman sul New York Times: non va tanto per il sottile il nostro Paul che conclude la sua analisi invocando sanzioni contro l'export cinese. Krugman denuncia la malafede cinese: In fact, far from representing a step in the right direction, the Chinese announcement was an exercise in bad faith — an attempt to exploit U.S. restraint. To keep the rhetorical temperature down, the Obama administration has used diplomatic language in its efforts to persuade the Chinese government to end its bad behavior. Now the Chinese have responded by seizing on the form of American language to avoid dealing with the substance of American complaints. In short, they’re playing games. Secondo Krugman la Cina ha artificialmente depresso il cambio in questi anni tanto è vero che the central bank is accumulating so many dollars, euros and other foreign assets — more than $2 trillion worth so far. Così facendo favorisce l'esportazione e protegge il mercato interno dalle importazioni, danneggiando l'economia mondiale e mettendone in pericolo la ripresa. La cosa è particolarmente grave in questo momento di debolezza della domanda: In normal times, you could argue that Chinese purchases of U.S. bonds, while distorting trade, were at least supplying us with cheap credit — and you could argue that it wasn’t China’s fault that we used that credit to inflate a vast, destructive housing bubble. But right now we’re awash in cheap credit; what’s lacking is sufficient demand for goods and services to generate the jobs we need. And China, by running an artificial trade surplus, is aggravating that problem. (...) Well, China has allowed the renminbi to rise — but barely. As of Thursday, the currency was only about half a percent higher than its typical level before the announcement. And all indications are that watching the future movement of the renminbi will be like watching paint dry: Chinese officials are still making statements denying that a rise in their currency will do anything to reduce trade imbalances, and prices in the forward market, in which traders agree to exchange currencies at various points in the future, suggest a rise of only about 2 percent in the renminbi by the end of this year. This is basically a joke. (...) what America, and the world, wants (and has the right to demand): a much stronger renminbi. Having the currency bob up or down slightly makes no difference to the fundamentals. So what comes next? China’s government is clearly trying to string the rest of us along, putting off action until something — it’s hard to say what — comes up.
    That’s not acceptable. China needs to stop giving us the runaround and deliver real change. And if it refuses, it’s time to talk about trade sanctions. 
  •  Secondo gli analisti di Forbes, collaboratori dell'Economonitor promosso da Nouriel Roubini, uno yuan più forte dovrebbe sostenere gli asset rischiosi: We expect China to allow a modest and nominal appreciation against the USD of no more than 4% on an annual basis in the next year. Yet even though we expect gradualism and caution from the PBoC, we predict global markets--and particularly risk assets and proxies for China revaluation, especially in Emerging Market Asia--will react positively to the move in the short-term. Ma non mancano le ambiguità e le preoccupazioni: The uncertainty could provide the PBoC greater discretion to manage the CNY's real effective exchange rate, albeit at the cost of some autonomy in monetary policy. The longer-term effect could well be a paradoxical eventual depreciation against the USD, which would help offset the competitiveness losses from the recent sharp fall in the EUR. After all, the euro zone is China's largest export destination. 
  •  Infine vi segnalo l'analisi dell'Economist così come l'approfondimento sulle prospettive future del cambio dollaro/yuan: The last time the central bank let the currency crawl, it clambered up by 21% against the dollar over three years. But it may not match that pace this time. China will not want the yuan to get too far ahead of other significant currencies that may be falling against the dollar. As the central bank says, China now has a “long and diversified” list of trading partners. Against a broad basket of their currencies, the yuan has already risen this year; against the euro it has strengthened by 17%. On any given day the yuan may also slip, as well as climb, against the dollar. The central bank is keen to deter “hot money” that might seep past the country’s capital controls, looking to profit from a stronger currency. Mark Williams of Capital Economics, a research firm, thinks it has already succeeded. The currency forwards market expects the yuan to appreciate by only 2.2% over the next 12 months, a slender return given the hassle of getting money in and out of China.

Due parole sulla performance dei segnali in questo primo semestre: un portafoglio equipesato concentrato nei primi 3 asset della classifica settimanale e settimanalmente ribilanciato ha  reso l'8.1% da inizio anno, con un drawdown massimo (calcolato sulle chiusure settimanali) inferiore al 5%. Restringendo la scelta ai primi due asset il rendimento cala leggermente al 6.9%. Non troppo male in un anno che finora ha visto i principali indici azionari europei andare in rosso. Ecco la tabella tratta dal Il Sole 24 Ore Plus con i rendimenti dei fondi di investimento divisi per categoria. Gli indici bilanciati hanno reso da inizio anno poco meno del 2%.

Ecco l'aggiornamento al 25 giugno 2010.

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