sabato 8 maggio 2010

La Grecia abbandonerà l'euro? Aggiornamento al 7 maggio 2010.

Immeregendosi nella lettura dei giornali questa mattina è difficile non trovarsi d'accordo con le considerazioni dell'Economist nella sua analisi della crisi innescata dal (tentativo di) bailout della Grecia (la figura con le interconnessioni del debito dei PIIGS è invece tratta dal New York Times):

IF THERE was ever a week to be depressed about the euro, this was it. After an age of dithering, Europe’s politicians cobble together a colossal rescue package for Greece, worth some €110 billion ($145 billion), nearly three times the level discussed only three weeks ago—and behold the results: carnage on the streets of Athens, where three people lost their lives, and no respite in the markets. Not only have yields on short-term Greek bonds soared once again, but other euro members that the plan was supposed to wall off are under pressure, with Portugal and Ireland hit particularly hard. Stockmarkets around the world have slumped as investors fret about the financial stability of a region that makes up almost a quarter of the world economy.(...)
Despite its massive price tag, investors are unconvinced by the bail-out strategy for three separate (and hardly irrational) reasons. First, they fret that the promised €110 billion will not materialise because of continued political opposition in Germany or because the Greeks will not live up to the austerity promises they have made. Second, investors, like German voters, are nervous that, no matter how hard the Greeks try, their country will still be all but bust in three years’ time: the debts are just too big and will have to be rescheduled. Third, and most important, they worry that others, especially Ireland, Portugal and Spain, are in uncomfortably similar boats, facing a future of economic stagnation and spiralling debt.  (...) the numbers for Greece are grim: even if one assumes three years of austerity, the country’s debt burden will have risen to 140% of GDP. Greece will still be perilously close to insolvency. It will surely need more help—either an open-ended rollover of the official loans or some kind of debt rescheduling. This is the contradiction in the rescue plan. EU governments and the IMF refuse to discuss the possibility of an eventual rescheduling of Greek debt for fear that it would spark uncontrolled contagion. In fact, the logic may increasingly be the opposite. By refusing to admit that Greece faces an obvious solvency problem, whereas Spain, Portugal and Ireland do not, Europe’s policymakers have made it harder to draw a clear distinction between Greece and the rest. As a result contagion has intensified.
That is the dynamic that must be changed. One priority is more zealous action by Portugal, Spain and others to prove that, although they suffer from some of the same ailments, they are not Greece. Portugal, which has a big deficit and low growth, needs to announce a stronger, bolder fiscal package. Both it and Spain need to speed up competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms, especially freeing up their labour markets. At the same time, the rest of the euro zone must do its part to ensure that this huge internal adjustment succeeds. The ECB must prevent an overall slide into deflation. Germany should cut taxes and do more to boost domestic demand.

Sull'evoluzione futura della Grecia ecco le conclusioni dell'editoriale di Krugman sul NYTimes di ieri:

So is a debt restructuring — a polite term for partial default — the answer? It wouldn’t help nearly as much as many people imagine, because interest payments only account for part of Greece’s budget deficit. Even if it completely stopped servicing its debt, the Greek government wouldn’t free up enough money to avoid savage budget cuts.
The only thing that could seriously reduce Greek pain would be an economic recovery, which would both generate higher revenues, reducing the need for spending cuts, and create jobs. If Greece had its own currency, it could try to engineer such a recovery by devaluing that currency, increasing its export competitiveness. But Greece is on the euro.
So how does this end? Logically, I see three ways Greece could stay on the euro.
First, Greek workers could redeem themselves through suffering, accepting large wage cuts that make Greece competitive enough to add jobs again. Second, the European Central Bank could engage in much more expansionary policy, among other things buying lots of government debt, and accepting — indeed welcoming — the resulting inflation; this would make adjustment in Greece and other troubled euro-zone nations much easier. Or third, Berlin could become to Athens what Washington is to Sacramento — that is, fiscally stronger European governments could offer their weaker neighbors enough aid to make the crisis bearable.
The trouble, of course, is that none of these alternatives seem politically plausible.
What remains seems unthinkable: Greece leaving the euro. But when you’ve ruled out everything else, that’s what’s left.
If it happens, it will play something like Argentina in 2001, which had a supposedly permanent, unbreakable peg to the dollar. Ending that peg was considered unthinkable for the same reasons leaving the euro seems impossible: even suggesting the possibility would risk crippling bank runs. But the bank runs happened anyway, and the Argentine government imposed emergency restrictions on withdrawals. This left the door open for devaluation, and Argentina eventually walked through that door.
If something like that happens in Greece, it will send shock waves through Europe, possibly triggering crises in other countries. But unless European leaders are able and willing to act far more boldly than anything we’ve seen so far, that’s where this is heading.

Il Sole24Ore oggi in prima pagina ospita una difesa delle agenzie di rating relativamente alla crisi del debito sovrano che si sta sviluppando in questi mesi. In questo video Bill Gross di PIMCO analizza il ruolo delle agenzie di rating nella crisi finanziaria accusandole di essere troppo lente e troppo vicine agli interessi delle banche di investimento

Una settimana pesantissima per le borse, i fondi immobiliari, le materie prime e per l'euro, solo le obbligazioni europee a lungo termine registrano un rendimento positivo. Ecco l'aggiornamento al 7 maggio 2010.

1 commento:

giovanni.gambino ha detto...

è difficile non concordare con Krugman sul fatto che la Grecia non possa più stare in Eu...egli dice giustamente che mai la germania accetterà inflazione per dare alla grecia deflazione competitiva, vista la parità dei cambi.