Il presidente U.S.A. Barack Obama ha proposto una "tassa di responsabilità per la crisi finanziaria" per costringere le grandi banche e le altre istituzioni finanziarie a restituire ai contribuenti il denaro ricevuto per il loro salvataggio durante la crisi. Secondo il presidente:“Like clockwork, the banks and politicians who curry their favor are already trying to stop this fee from going into effect,” he said, using his weekly radio and Internet addresses to promote the plan he announced this past week.
“The very same firms reaping billions of dollars in profits, and reportedly handing out more money in bonuses and compensation than ever before in history, are now pleading poverty. It’s a sight to see.”
If banks can afford to pay out all those bonuses, he said, then they can repay taxpayers, too.
“We’re not going to let Wall Street take the money and run. We’re going to pass this fee into law,”
L'imposta dovrebbe fruttare circa 90 miliardi di dollari in circa 10 anni di applicazione, ma la sua durata potrebbe essere estesa se le perdite del fondo di bailout non fossero recuperate entro il prossimo decennio.
Secondo il New York Times
Six of the biggest American banks are on track to pay $150 billion in total executive compensation for 2009, slightly less than the record $164 billion in 2007 before the financial crisis struck,
mentre le più recenti stime le perdite sostenute dai contribuenti attraverso il piano TARP (il Troubled Asset Relief Programme, il fondo per il salvataggio delle grandi imprese allestito all'apice della crisi finanziaria) ammonteranno a circa 117 miliardi di dollari.
Se così fosse, il costo netto per i contribuenti USA si limiterà a meno dell'1% del GDP,ben al di sotto degli oltre 1100 miliardi ottenuti sommando al piano TARP originario (700 miliardi) gli oltre 400 miliardi previsti per assicurare la solvibilità di Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac.
Per i dettagli del pianobisognerà però attendere l'approvazione della legge finanziaria per l'anno
fiscale 2011, prevista per i primi di febbraio. La parola definitiva spetterà quindi al Congresso.
Di questa legge parla su Plus (il settimanale di finanza e risparmio del Sole 24 Ore) il corrispondente da New York Mario Platero nel suo commento (che condivido ampiamente) intitolato Banche sciocche sui bonus. Scrive Platero:
Quando qualcuno sui giornali esprimeva dubbi sulla trasparenza morale di questa accumulazione di ricchezza, le banche strillavano: siamo stati bravi, abbiamo assunto dei rischi, abbiamo avuto ragione, l'America premia chi ha successo. Vero, l'America premia chi ha successo ma non chi ne approffitta: e qui le banche non solo hanno avuto aiuti dal governo federale, ma hanno ricevuto garanzie da parte della Fed e una diminuzione dei tassi di interesse su livelli reali negativi. L'idea era che potessero in questo modo far circolare liquidità, attraverso prestiti e finanziamenti. Invece hanno soprattutto finanziato se stesse.
Sempre a proposito delle banche e delle audizioni che sono in corso alla Camera dei Rappresentanti, scrive Paul Krugman nel suo ultimo editoriale sul New York Times:
The official Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission — the group that aims to hold a modern version of the Pecora hearings of the 1930s, whose investigations set the stage for New Deal bank regulation — began taking testimony on Wednesday. In its first panel, the commission grilled four major financial-industry honchos. What did we learn?
Well, if you were hoping for a Perry Mason moment — a scene in which the witness blurts out: “Yes! I admit it! I did it! And I’m glad!” — the hearing was disappointing. What you got, instead, was witnesses blurting out: “Yes! I admit it! I’m clueless!”O.K., not in so many words. But the bankers’ testimony showed a stunning failure, even now, to grasp the nature and extent of the current crisis. And that’s important: It tells us that as Congress and the administration try to reform the financial system, they should ignore advice coming from the supposed wise men of Wall Street, who have no wisdom to offer.
Consider what has happened so far: The U.S. economy is still grappling with the consequences of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression; trillions of dollars of potential income have been lost; the lives of millions have been damaged, in some cases irreparably, by mass unemployment; millions more have seen their savings wiped out; hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, will lose essential health care because of the combination of job losses and draconian cutbacks by cash-strapped state governments.
And this disaster was entirely self-inflicted. This isn’t like the stagflation of the 1970s, which had a lot to do with soaring oil prices, which were, in turn, the result of political instability in the Middle East. This time we’re in trouble entirely thanks to the dysfunctional nature of our own financial system. Everyone understands this — everyone, it seems, except the financiers themselves. (...)
there was nothing accidental about the crisis. From the late 1970s on, the American financial system, freed by deregulation and a political climate in which greed was presumed to be good, spun ever further out of control. There were ever-greater rewards — bonuses beyond the dreams of avarice — for bankers who could generate big short-term profits. And the way to raise those profits was to pile up ever more debt, both by pushing loans on the public and by taking on ever-higher leverage within the financial industry. Sooner or later, this runaway system was bound to crash. And if we don’t make fundamental changes, it will happen all over again.
Un altro argomento di attualità è l'aumento del debito sovrano dei paesi sviluppati (Regno Unito in prima fila)
causato dalla crisi finanziaria. Sul sito di Nouriel Roubini trovate un'interessante analisi del problema intitolata
Sovereign Debt: The Developed World’s Next Big Problem?: scrive Arpitha Bykere:
In 2009, downgrades and debt auction failures in countries like the UK, Greece, Ireland and Spain were a stark reminder that unless advanced economies begin to put their fiscal houses in order, investors and rating agencies will likely turn from friends to foes. The severe recession, combined with a financial crisis during 2008-09, worsened the fiscal positions of developed countries due to stimulus spending, lower tax revenues and support to the financial sector. (...) Going forward, a weak economic recovery and an aging population is likely to increase the debt burden of many advanced economies, including the U.S., UK, Japan and several eurozone countries. In 2008-09, the stance of these governments to do “whatever it takes” to backstop their financial systems and keep their economies afloat soothed investor concerns. But if countries remain biased toward continuing with loose fiscal and monetary policies to support growth rather than focusing on fiscal consolidation, investors will become increasingly concerned about fiscal sustainability and gradually move out of debt markets they have long considered “safe havens.”
Most central banks will withdraw liquidity starting in 2010, but government financing needs will remain high thereafter. Monetization and increased debt issuances by governments in the developed world will raise inflation expectations. These governments will have to offer higher real yields or investors will move to more attractive emerging markets. Some countries will continue to witness increased credit default swaps. Higher yields and interest cost on debt will also hurt economic growth—by crowding out private consumption and investment, and reducing government’s productive spending. (...)
The UK, Spain, Greece and Ireland will face sovereign risk pressures, especially if their fiscal imbalances are not addressed immediately. (...) The U.S. and Japan might be among the last to face investor aversion—the dollar is the global reserve currency and the U.S. has the deepest and most liquid debt markets, while Japan is a net creditor and largely finances its debt domestically. But investors will turn increasingly cautious even about these countries if the necessary fiscal reforms are delayed.
Most central banks will withdraw liquidity starting in 2010, but government financing needs will remain high thereafter. Monetization and increased debt issuances by governments in the developed world will raise inflation expectations. These governments will have to offer higher real yields or investors will move to more attractive emerging markets. Some countries will continue to witness increased credit default swaps. Higher yields and interest cost on debt will also hurt economic growth—by crowding out private consumption and investment, and reducing government’s productive spending. (...)
The UK, Spain, Greece and Ireland will face sovereign risk pressures, especially if their fiscal imbalances are not addressed immediately. (...) The U.S. and Japan might be among the last to face investor aversion—the dollar is the global reserve currency and the U.S. has the deepest and most liquid debt markets, while Japan is a net creditor and largely finances its debt domestically. But investors will turn increasingly cautious even about these countries if the necessary fiscal reforms are delayed.
Intanto tutti si interrogano se il rally delle borse possa continuare nel 2010 (e ci sono buone ragioni per dubitarne). Specialmente dopo una settimana a dir poco scialba caratterizzata da un indebolimento degli asset rischiosi (azioni e materia prime). Volendo concludere il commento di questa settimana con una nota ottimistica vi segnalo l'analisi di chartoftheday relativa alla durata dei rally dell'indice Dow Jones dal 1900. Se siete tra quelli che pensano che la statistica venga prima di ogni altra considerazione potreste trovarla rincuorante. Infine vi segnalo come l'asset allocation quantitativa si faccia strada anche nel supplemento settimanale Plus del Sole 24 Ore: a partire dal numero in edicola nelle pagine con le classifiche delle azioni dello Stoxx 600 si confronteranno delle strategie di stock picking quantitative, un'idea proposta da un gruppo di lavoro AIAF promosso da yours truly.
Ecco l'aggiornamento al 15 gennaio 2010.
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